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INTRODUCTION
Social gatherings that began as innocuous mass pillow fights in
parks or choreographed break-dancing in local shopping malls are
now raising serious First Amendment questions. A ubiquitous
international phenomenon known as the ―flash mob‖ debuted in
2003.1 At the start, ―[a] group of people would arrange to meet in
a public place at a particular time and would perform a song or a
dance number or some other form of entertainment very suddenly
and without warning.‖2 In recent months, however, ―the term
‗flash mob‘ has rapidly come to mean something else.‖3 People
are ―using social media and other forms of communication to
coordinate shocking large scale crimes‖ such as robberies,4 that
often result in serious violence. Sometimes these groups are
involved in mass shoplifting or looting, and are even ―committing
random acts of violence.‖5 Young people have convened to
―attack people both in public but also on private property, acts
which have resulted in serious physical and psychological trauma,
and even murder.‖6 These mobs have been ―organized through

1

Alexander Baron, Op-Ed., The Man Who Monitors Violent Flash Mobs, DIGITAL
JOURNAL (Sept. 17, 2011), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/311622.
2
Flash Mob Epidemic, AM. DREAM (Aug. 16, 2011), http://endoftheamerican
dream.com/archives/flash-mob-epidemic.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Baron, supra note 1; see also Ian Urbina, Mobs Are Born as Word Grows by Text
Message, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/03/25/us/25mobs.html. The New York Times reported a particularly bad flash
mob incident in Philadelphia, noting that the teenagers involved participated in ―a ritual
that is part bullying, part running of the bulls: sprinting down the block, the teenagers
sometimes pause to brawl with one another, assault pedestrians or vandalize property.‖
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technological means–either on social media networks like
Facebook and Twitter, or through text message or email.‖ 7
Regulatory responses to this electronically orchestrated
violence have varied.8 While the violent criminal acts themselves
are clearly punishable, what remains unclear is how to legally
penalize digital speech—tweets, alerts, Facebook status updates—
that brings about the mobs in the first place. Following a violent
flash mob incident at a town fair this summer, the city of
Cleveland passed a law intended to bar ―improper use of social
media to violate ordinances on disorderly conduct, public
intoxication and unlawful congregation by promoting illegal flash
mob activity.‖9 This issue has also arisen in England: following a
rampage of criminal conduct in London and other English cities,
British Prime Minister David Cameron said he was considering
legislation to ―stop people communicating via these websites . . .
when we know they are plotting violence, disorder and
criminality.‖10
Quelling such violence is a desirable goal, but criminalizing the
speech that leads to it may amount to a First Amendment violation.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,11 the Supreme Court developed the
current test for when the government may proscribe advocacy
speech, ruling that ―constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.‖12 Laws criminalizing
speech that incites flash mobs must thus be analyzed through the
Brandenburg lens.
7

What are Flash Mobs?, INT‘L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/
articles/212400/20110912/flash-mob-what-are-flash-mobs-haka.htm.
8
See, e.g., id. (discussing Cleveland‘s city council decision to ban the use of cell
phones to start a flash mob); Urbina, supra note 6 (explaining that Philadelphia is seeking
assistance from the FBI to monitor electronic prompts).
9
Floyd Abrams, Flash Mob Violence and the Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119045832045765445310394095
22.html
10
Id.
11
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
12
Id. at 447.
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Lyle Denniston, a National Constitution Center adviser,
indicated that ―decisions such as Brandenburg . . . have set the bar
pretty high.‖13
He has stated, ―[a] Twitter or Facebook
message . . . would have to say, ‗We will meet at Broad and
Market Street tomorrow at 10:30 and begin an assault on City Hall.
Bring your Uzis.‘ If it‘s not that explicit or direct, it would be very
difficult to argue for regulation.‖14 If challenged, laws like the
Cleveland Ordinance would be unlikely to pass constitutional
muster due to facial vagueness, and would likely fail the
Brandenburg analysis. The Cleveland Ordinance is vague with
regard to ―who would be open to prosecution or how police would
determine whether social media caused‖ the criminal activity.15 It
is, nevertheless, possible for state and local governments to enact
valid laws with the goal of deterring the violent acts that are often
increasingly the result of flash mobs, without disturbing the
Court‘s speech-protective holding in Brandenburg, if the test is
applied flexibly.
This Note will argue that content-based laws designed to
punish organizers of criminal flash mobs will best serve the
compelling goals of state and local governments to deter crime and
violence. Part I reviews the origin of flash mobs and the current
use of social media as a platform for organizing criminal activity.
It then discusses the Supreme Court decisions that led to
Brandenburg, as well as the Court‘s development of the doctrines
of vagueness and overbreadth, content neutrality, viewpoint
neutrality, and time, place, or manner restrictions. Part II presents
two approaches to regulating violent flash mobs: implementing
laws that criminalize the speech that leads to flash mobs, and
content-neutral, time, place, or manner laws aimed at deterring
local violence. Part III demonstrates that, by enacting narrowlytailored content-based ordinances, it is possible for state and city
governments to enact constitutional laws that will punish and deter
13

John Timpane, Flash-Mob Violence Raises Weighty Questions, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Aug. 14, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-08-14/news/29886718_1_social-mediaflash-mob-facebook-and-other-services.
14
Id.
15
Vince Grzegorek, Cleveland‟s „Flash Mob‟ Law Fuzzy, Maybe Illegal, SCENE MAG.
(Jul. 26, 2011), http://www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2011/07/26/
clevelands-flash-mob-law-fuzzy-maybe-illegal.
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highly dangerous initiations of flash mobs without disturbing
Brandenburg‘s safeguard against chilling free speech. Part III also
proposes a model flash mob speech ordinance.
I. BACKGROUND: FLASH MOBS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
Before evaluating the viability of content-based and contentneutral flash mob laws, it is necessary to explore the history of
flash mobs and the recent violent and criminal activity associated
with them, and to briefly review First Amendment speech
jurisprudence, including the application of the Brandenburg test
and intermediate scrutiny.
A. Flash Mob Speech
1. What Are Flash Mobs and How Are They Started?
As defined by the Concise Oxford English Dictionary in 2004,
a flash mob is ―a sudden mass gathering, unanticipated except by
participants who communicate electronically.‖16 Flash mobs are
generally organized through technological means.17 Participants
are told when and where to meet, and because they almost always
use mobile devices to get in touch with each other, meeting places
and times can change instantly and frequently. From the
perspective of a bystander, ―flash mobs appear suddenly and
without warning.‖18 Contrary to their peaceful and humorous
origins, flash mobs have ―taken a darker twist as criminals exploit
the anonymity of crowds, using social networking to coordinate
everything from robberies to fights to general chaos.‖19 Flash

16

Flash Mob Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/flash+mob?region=us (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
17
See What are Flash Mobs?, supra note 7.
18
Id.
19
Eric Tucker & Thomas Watkins, More Flash Mobs Gather with Criminal Intent,
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44077826/ns/technology
_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/t/more-flash-mobs-gather-criminal-intent/#.TsL42ASMU4.
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mobs have recently been used during riots in England and street
protests in the Middle East.20
The first known flash mob took place in New York City on
June 17, 2003.21 The phenomenon‘s supposed creator is a man
named Bill Wasik, who incited the mob by e-mailing
approximately fifty people and asking them to gather at a store in
downtown Manhattan.22 When the store found out, Wasik
canceled the initial mob but summoned the crowd for a second
attempt.23 After participants were instructed by ―text messages,
emails and blog banter, a crowd of approximately 100 people
gathered in the home furnishing section of Macy‘s department
store‖ and stood around a $10,000 rug.24 As instructed by Wasik,
the participants told salespeople that they all ―lived together in a
free-love commune and that they wanted to purchase a ‗love
rug.‘‖25 According to those who observed the incident, ―the mob
dispersed rapidly after spending ten minutes discussing the rug
among themselves and with salespeople.‖26
Another early Manhattan flash mob involved hundreds of
people perched on a stone ledge in Central Park making bird
noises.27 Large cities around the world quickly adopted the trend
and hosted their own unique flash mobs.28 On July 24 in Rome,
―over 300 flash mobbers invaded a music and bookstore . . . spent
several minutes asking employees for nonexistent books before
applauding and dispersing.‖29 In 2003 in Vancouver, Canada, ―35
20

Scott McCabe, Flash Mobs Started as Playful Experiment, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug.
15, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/2011/08/flash-mobs-started-playfulexperiment#ixzz1dovgWbqA.
21
Judith A. Nicholson, Flash! Mobs in the Age of Mobile Connectivity, 6
FIBRECULTURE (2005), http://www.fibreculture.org/journal/issue6/issue6_nicholson.html.
22
See McCabe, supra note 20.
23
See Nicholson, supra note 21.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Amy Harmon, Ideas & Trends: Flash Mobs; Guess Some People Don‟t Have
Anything Better to Do, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08
/17/weekinreview/ideas-trends-flash-mobs-guess-some-people-don-t-have-anythingbetter-to-do.html.
28
See Nicholson, supra note 21.
29
Id.
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people met up . . . at a major intersection and did the twist, to
shouts and countershouts of ―Chubby!‖ and ―Checker!‘‘ . . .
[S]everal minutes later, the dancing halted and the flash mobbers
dispersed into the crowd of spectators that had gathered.‖30
2. Violent Flash Mobs in Current Events
Recent years have seen the rise of violent, malevolent ―flash
robs‖ in many cities across the United States and abroad.31 Four
examples of recent criminal flash mobs occurred in Cleveland,
Philadelphia, suburbs of Maryland, and San Francisco.
a) Cleveland
Cleveland Heights police were called to the Coventry Street
Arts Festival in June 2011, after approximately 1500 flash mobbers
―began rampaging, running, fighting, screaming, and yelling.‖32
The flash mob resulted in the arrests of fifteen mob participants for
felony aggravated riot.33 On July 4, 2011, Shaker Heights police
faced similar circumstances when several fights involving
hundreds of teenagers erupted at the city‘s Independence Day
fireworks display.34 The nearly-1000 teenagers who turned up to
the event to fight are believed to have mobilized through social
networking sites.35
In August 2011, Cleveland rapper ―Machine Gun Kelly‖ was
arrested after attempting to incite a flash mob at South Park Mall.36

30

Id.
See David Downs, The evolution of flash mobs from pranks to crime and revolution,
EXAMINER (Aug. 28, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/08/evolution-flashmobs-pranks-crime-and-revolution#ixzz1e5NkdAgX.
32
Robert O‘Brien, Violent Flash Mobs: Passing Fad or Here to Stay?, POLICE MAG.
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.policemag.com/Blog/SWAT/Story/2011/08/Violent-FlashMobs-Passing-Fad-or-Here-to-Stay.aspx.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Associated Press, Cleveland Flash Mob Fight Gathers Attention, CHRONICLE ONLINE
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://chronicle.northcoastnow.com/2011/08/09/cleveland-flash-mobfight-gathers-attention/.
36
Adam Rathe, Machine Gun Kelly Arrested: Rapper Busted for Inciting Flash Mob in
Cleveland Mall via Twitter, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 22, 2011),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-22/gossip/29936931_1_flash-mob-mallmanagement-bad-boy-records.
31
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The entertainer took to his Twitter account around 2:00 p.m. the
day of the mob and posted the following tweet: ―Today we flash
mob NO MATTER WHAT! 5pm at SouthPark [sic] mall in the
foodcourt, [sic] wear disguises, dont move to [sic] you hear
‗Cleveland‘ play then RAGE!‖37 Many fans heeded the rapper‘s
call and ―raged‖ at the mall.38 Although he was asked by the
police department to refrain from standing on a table, Kelly did it
anyway.39 Kelly was charged with disorderly conduct for his
actions at the mall, but not for inciting the mob. 40
b) Philadelphia
Philadelphia‘s flash mob problems began in the summer of
2009, and took a turn for the worse when thousands crowded the
South Street area on a March 2010 weekend, leading to injuries
and vandalism.41 The Philadelphia police, tipped off by ―some
alert and responsible parents,‖ thwarted a potential flash mob riot
on South Street.42
The teens, organized through Twitter,
descended on South Street around 9:00 p.m.43 A witness to the
incident recalled: ―[t]here was a crowd of people all running . . . on
both sides of the street and in the street. Not really listening to the
cops, who were trying to control everyone. And everyone was
angry and yelling.‖44 The police needed reinforcements to control
the mob.45 Multiple fights broke out, and police made several
arrests.46 By midnight, the police had prevailed and the mob
dispersed.47 During the episode, ―businesses on South Street
locked their doors, trying to keep their legitimate customers
37

See id.
See id.
39
See id.
40
Machine Gun Kelly Arrested After Inciting Flash Mob, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23,
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/21/machine-gun-kelly-arrested_n_
932390.html.
41
Vernon Odom, Police Contain Flash Mob on South Street, 6ABC.COM (Mar. 22,
2010), http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=7341962.
42
Id.
43
See id.
44
Id.
45
See id.
46
See id.
47
See id.
38

762

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:753

safe.‖48 One Philadelphia resident explained that the retailers ―had
to lock their doors because their patrons were afraid to leave.‖49
In February 2010 on a weekday afternoon in Center City, ―[a]s
many as 100 teens from three area high schools descended upon
The Gallery at Market East.‖50 When mall security quickly tried to
remove the teens, the crowd split up and became chaotic.51 The
groups swarmed Market Street approaching City Hall, with ―some
starting a large snowball fight on the building‘s grounds while
others began fighting on street corners.‖52 On their way to City
Hall, ―the teens darted through traffic and knocked strangers to the
ground.‖53 Some of the teens entered a Macy‘s department store,
where they damaged store property and stole clothing.54 One
witness estimated that between forty and fifty kids ransacked the
store.55 During the altercation, one teenage victim was kicked in
the head and taken to the hospital with head injuries.56 The
authorities believed that the incident had been coordinated using
Facebook or Twitter.57
On July 29, 2011, another incident occurred where
approximately thirty teenagers gathered near City Hall and
severely beat two people, leaving one unconscious and the other
with a badly broken jaw.58
c) Montgomery County and Silver Spring, Maryland
In August 2011, more than two-dozen teenagers rushed into a
7-Eleven convenience store in Germantown, Maryland ―and stole
48

Id.
Id.
50
Vince Lattanzio, Teen Mob Attack in Center City, NBC 10 PHILA. (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Huge-City-Hall-Snowball-Fight-LandsTeens-in-Jail-84517507.html.
51
See id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
Id.
58
See Daniel Tovrov, Will Philadelphia‟s Flash Mob Curfew be Effective?, INT‘L BUS.
TIMES, (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/198282/20110815/philadelphiaflash-mob-2011-curfew-michael-nutter.htm.
49
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snacks, drinks and other items.‖59 Like the violence in Center
City, Philadelphia, Germantown police also suspected that
Facebook and Twitter, or perhaps other social media, had been
used to organize the mob.60 Starks, a spokesman for the
Germantown police force said, ―the store clerk pressed the silent
alarm when he belatedly realized there was a robbery in progress,
and a police cruiser responded in under a minute. But by then, the
mob was gone.‖61
A near-identical incident took place in Silver Spring in
November 2011, when fifty teenagers stormed a 7-Eleven at
around 11:20 p.m. on a Saturday night.62 The teens stole drinks
and snacks and fled the scene before police arrived.63
d) San Francisco
In the San Francisco Bay Area, Bay Area Rapid Transit
(BART) security has recently encountered mob behavior like never
before.64 According to BART spokesman Linton Johnson, ―[t]he
difference between 10 years ago and now is massive . . .
[t]echnology has just made it easier to organize faster.‖65 In
August 2011, Johnson received word that a group had organized
under ―instructions to carry masks, wear black and converge en
masse to foment chaos at specific times and places‖ with the intent
to disrupt BART train service as a form of protest.66 BART
security responded by shutting off its underground cell phone
service.67
59

Edecio Martinez, Flash Mob Robs Maryland 7-Eleven, CBS NEWS (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20092862-504083.html.
60
Jack Cloherty, Flash Mob Loots 7-11 Store in Germantown, Maryland, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/flash-mob-turns-felony-germantown/
story?id=14316655#.TsW6-2ASMU4. The incident was caught on security cameras and
the frightening video can be seen at the link.
61
Id.
62
Police Investigate Silver Spring 7-Eleven Mass Theft, ABC2NEWS.COM (Nov. 21,
2011),
http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/news/police-investigate-silver-spring-7-elevenmass-theft.
63
Id.
64
See Downs, supra note 31.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See id.
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B. The Difficulty of Preventing and Controlling Flash Mobs
Violent and criminal flash mobs are on the rise in American
cities. The mobs are particularly hard for police to control because
of their secretive, spontaneous and fleeting nature.
Criminal flash mobs are an increasingly common threat to the
police force and to society. The increasing violent flash mob
problems have been described as ―waves of rampaging flash mobs
running, stealing, assaulting, and robbing innocent people and
businesses.‖68 Dangerous ―flash robs‖ show no sign of slowing
down in the near future. The New York-based brokerage unit of
Marsh & McLennan noted that ―thieves that take advantage of
flash mob techniques to organize and overwhelm stores present a
risk during the holiday shopping season.‖69 Marsh noted that ten
percent of retailers surveyed by the National Retail Federation in
the summer of 2011 reported ―being victimized by at least one
criminal flash mob event over the previous 12 months.‖70 Those
mobs often resulted in ―injuries to customers or employees, theft
and property damage.‖71
Moreover, flash mobs are spontaneous, anonymous, and
difficult to stop. Marsh further stated, ―using social media,
criminals can direct large groups of individuals to specific
locations to disrupt business and traffic, with the chaos that
sometimes results escalating to a level that can‘t be controlled by
loss prevention, mall security or police.‖72 Joe La Rocca,
spokesperson for the National Retail Federation, said that ―[t]hese
incidents can turn violent, they can injure customers, they can
damage the store and then there‘s the financial losses the retailers
suffer.‖73 In most cases of this sort, ―by the time the police arrive,

68

O‘Brien, supra note 32, at 1.
Rodd
Zolkos,
Flash
Mobs
Pose
Threat
to
Retailers:
Marsh,
BUSINESSINSURANCE.COM (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.businessinsurance.com
/article/20111117/NEWS06/111119902?tags=%7C59%7C338%7C69%7C71%7C340%7
C302%7C83.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Cloherty, supra note 60, at 1.
69
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the mob is long gone, making for a long arduous process to
identify and prosecute the culprits.‖74
C. History of Constitutional Speech Protection in the United
States
Before examining the First Amendment issues presented by
violent flash mobs and related laws, it is necessary to review the
history of the Supreme Court‘s application of the First Amendment
in speech cases, and to examine the background principles that
govern laws that allegedly violate the First Amendment. Speech
that organizes flash mobs falls under the category of ―incitement
speech‖ and laws that purport to regulate that speech must be
evaluated under the speech-protective Brandenburg test.75 Laws
that regulate only the time, place or manner of activity are
evaluated under a less-stringent intermediate scrutiny analysis; that
is, they will be permitted if they serve a ―substantial‖ or
―significant‖ governmental interest, and leave open ―ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.‖76
1. The Boundaries of First Amendment Protections
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress
of grievances.‖77 The First Amendment‘s guarantees of freedom
of speech, press, religion, assembly, and petition are among ―the
most cherished‖ fundamental rights of Americans.78

74

See id.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 999
(3rd ed. 2006).
76
See id. at 1131.
77
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78
1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE NIMMER, ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:1 (3d ed.
1996).
75
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2. Protecting Speech and the Development of the ―Clear and
Present Danger‖ Test
The Supreme Court first addressed First Amendment speech
concerns in Schenck v. United States,79 demonstrating a very weak
level of speech protection.80 Schenck, a Socialist Party official,
distributed a leaflet opposing United States participation in World
War I and was indicted under the Espionage Act for conspiracy to
cause insubordination in the armed forces and to obstruct the
recruitment and enlistment of soldiers.81 In upholding Schenck‘s
conviction, Justice Holmes articulated what would later become
the ―clear and present danger‖ test, stating that the ―question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.‖82 The Court found that
Schenck‘s leaflet created a clear and present danger, placing it
outside of the First Amendment‘s protective coverage.83 It is
important to note the low shield of political speech depicted in
Schenck. The leaflet at issue merely advocated that citizens
exercise their right to assert opposition to the draft, and did not call
for any violence, yet still, the Court found no First Amendment
protection.84
The following week, the Court confirmed Schenck‘s low level
of speech protection in Debs v. United States.85 Like Schenck,
Debs was a Socialist Party leader convicted under the Espionage
Act.86 His crime was a speech made to an audience at a Socialist
Party convention, which predicted the ultimate success of
Socialism.87 Referring to the ultra-low level of protection afforded
in the opinion, American legal scholar Harry Kalven, Jr. referred to
the Debs decision as ―a low point in the Court‘s performance in
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

249 U.S. 47 (1919).
See id.
See id. at 48–49.
Id. at 52. Justice Holmes concluded that ―[i]t is a question of proximity and degree.‖
See id. at 52.
See id. at 51–53.
249 U.S. 211 (1919).
See id. at 212.
See id. at 212–16.
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speech cases.‖88 Subsequent to its decisions in Schenck and Debs,
the Supreme Court continued to affirm similar convictions under
the Espionage Act. In Abrams v. United States,89 the Court upheld
the convictions of two defendants who distributed leaflets
denouncing the American participation in the Russian revolution.90
Interestingly, however, in his dissent in Abrams, Justice Holmes
(who authored the majority opinions in Schenck and Debs)
advocated for a more stringent application of the ―clear and present
danger‖ test, finding that neither the danger nor the intent prong
was met in Abrams.91
The Court briefly retreated from the application of the ―clear
and present danger‖ test in the mid-1920s in its decisions in Gitlow
v. New York92 and Whitney v. California.93 In Gitlow, the Court
upheld the conviction of members of the Socialist Party for their
publication of the Left Wing Manifesto under a New York state
statute criminalizing the advocacy of anarchy.94 The Court found
the statute to be constitutionally valid pursuant to a state‘s right to
―punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized
government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.‖95
Justice Holmes again dissented, advocating for application of the
―clear and present danger‖ test and finding that the published
manifesto was a non-threatening statement of political theory.96
Similarly, in Whitney, the Court upheld the conviction of a
Communist Labor Party member for violating the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act.97 Anita Whitney was charged with
helping to establish a group devoted to advocating for the
88
HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 136 (1988) (―[I]f Eugene Debs can be
sent to jail for a public speech, what, if anything, can the ordinary man safely say against
the war?‖).
89
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
90
See id.
91
See id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (―It is only the present danger of immediate
evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.‖).
92
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
93
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
94
See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 655, 670.
95
Id. at 667.
96
Id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97
See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359, 371.
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overthrow of the United States government.98 Upholding Gitlow,
the Court held that California had the power to punish those who
abuse their rights to speech ―by utterances inimical to the public
welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or
endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its
overthrow by unlawful means.‖99
a) Dennis v. United States and the Solidification of ―Clear
and Present Danger‖
During the 1930s and 1940s, the Court re-embraced the ―clear
and present danger‖ standard. In Dennis v. United States,100 the
majority affirmed the convictions of Communist Party organizers
under the Smith Act.101 A plurality applied Justice Hand‘s
interpretation of the ―clear and present danger‖ test, formulated in
the lower court: ―‗In each case courts must ask whether the gravity
of the ‗evil,‘ discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.‘‖102
The Court found that Dennis‘s advocacy of communist ideas
constituted a clear and present danger threatening the existence of
the United States government.103
b) Brandenburg v. Ohio and the Per Se Constitutionality
of Advocacy Speech
The Court decidedly repudiated the ―clear and present danger‖
test in its 1969 decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.104 Clarence
Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader in rural Ohio, organized a
filmed rally that showed several men in robes and hoods, some
carrying firearms, first burning a cross and then making
speeches.105 One of the speeches referred to the possibility of
taking ―revengeance‖ against niggers, Jews, and those who

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

See id. at 359–63.
Id. at 371.
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
See id. at 516–17.
Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
See id. at 516–17.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
See id. at 445–46.
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supported them.106 Another speech proclaimed that, if ―our
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress
the white, Caucasian race,‖ then a march on Washington would
take place on the Fourth of July.107 Brandenburg was charged with
advocating violence under Ohio‘s criminal syndicalism statute for
his participation in the rally and his speech.108 In relevant part, the
statute prohibited ―advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or
propriety of violence as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform‖ and ―voluntarily assembl[ing] with a group
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism.‖109 The Court held that the law proscribed the
advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not
that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless
action.110 The failure to make this distinction rendered the law
overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.111 The Court
reversed Brandenburg‘s conviction, holding that the government
cannot punish ―mere abstract‖ advocacy of force or violation of the
law.112
In its per curiam opinion, the Court declined to apply the ―clear
and present danger‖ test, using instead the language ―imminent
lawless action‖ to articulate a new test.113 In drawing the line of
constitutional censorship to cover only speech that ―is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action,‖ Brandenburg completely abrogated
Whitney‟s central holding.114 The Court held that ―mere advocacy‖
of any principle or ideology, including one that assumed the
necessity of violence or illegal action, was per se constitutionally
protected speech.115 The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the

106

See id. at 446–47.
Id. at 446.
108
See id. at 444–45.
109
Id. at 448 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29231.13 (West 2012)).
110
See id. at 448–49.
111
See id. at 447–49.
112
See id.
113
See id. at 447.
114
See id.
115
See id. at 448–49; see also Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
107
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Brandenburg decision as having established an inherent right to
advocate lawlessness.116
The Brandenburg test is comprised of three distinct elements:
intent, imminence, and likelihood.117 It is now necessary for the
government to consider not only the presence of a danger, but also
the proximity of the danger to the speaker‘s intent to provoke that
danger.118 The test is more speech-protective than the ―clear and
present danger‖ test, making it difficult for states to proscribe
advocacy speech in most instances. However, it is still not entirely
clear if ―imminence‖ requires immediacy in the context of First
Amendment speech.119
Four years later, the Court applied the Bradenburg test in Hess
v. Indiana,120 where it overturned the conviction of a defendant
who declared, ―[w]e‘ll take the fucking street later,‖ to a crowd at
an antiwar demonstration while the sheriff and deputies were
attempting to clear the street.121 The Court held that the defendant
could not be punished under Brandenburg because his words did
not have ―a tendency to lead to violence,‖ primarily because they
were not directed at a specific person or group of people and
because they called for illegal action only ―at some indefinite,
future time.‖122 This indicates that speech that is directed at
particular individuals or a group and calls for illegal action at a
specified time may pass the Brandenburg hurdle and can be
subject to regulation, even if it does not tend to produce, or
actually produce, immediate lawless action.
D. Prior Restraint, Vagueness and Overbreadth, and the
Difference Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral Laws
In its First Amendment speech jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has presumed the invalidity of laws that either restrict
116

See Rice, 128 F.3d at 443.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 999.
118
See id. at 998–99.
119
See id. at 999–1000. In relation to homicide committed in self-defense, the term
―imminent danger‖ means ―immediate danger.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed.
1990).
120
414 U.S. 105 (1973).
121
See id. at 106–07.
122
See id. at 108–09.
117
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expression prior to its publication or are facially vague or
overbroad.123 The Court has also differentiated between ―contentbased‖ and ―content-neutral‖ restrictions on speech, applying
different levels of constitutional scrutiny in evaluating the validity
of such laws.124 Content-based laws and regulations punish certain
kinds of speech based on their subject matter or message.125
Content-neutral restrictions regulate speech because the speech
creates secondary effects, such as violence or immorality, or is
being uttered in a proscribed time, place or manner.126
1. Prior Restraint
The Court has imposed a heavy presumption against the
validity of laws that ban expression of ideas prior to their
publication.127 In Near v. Minnesota, the Court struck down a state
law that permitted public officials to seek an injunction to stop
publication of any ―malicious, scandalous and defamatory
newspaper, magazine or other periodical.‖128 The majority called
the results of the law ―the essence of censorship‖ and declared it
unconstitutional.129 While prior restraints are invalid, as a general
matter, the restriction is not absolute; for example, the rule does
not prevent governments from prohibiting publication of detailed
information that would threaten national security in a time of
war.130

123

See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); CHEMERINSKY, supra note

75.
124

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 932.
See id. at 936–39.
126
See id.
127
See generally Near, 283 U.S. 697.
128
Id. at 701.
129
Id. at 713.
130
See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101–02 (1979) (holding that
―sanction[s] for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information‖ require the ―highest
form of state interest to sustain . . . [their] validity,‖ and noting that ―prior restraints have
been accorded the most exacting scrutiny in previous cases.‖); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (―Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.‖).
125
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2. Vagueness and Overbreadth
The doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are ―closely
related‖ and laws that regulate speech are often challenged on both
grounds.131 Both claims involve facial constitutional challenges to
existing laws.132 However, it is important not to conflate the two
concepts because while a law may be both vague and overbroad, it
can also be overbroad, but not vague, or vague, but not
overbroad.133 According to legal scholar Peter Poulos, ―the
primary purposes of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are:
(1) to prevent a ‗chilling effect‘ on generally innocent or
constitutionally protected activity, and (2) to prevent the arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of laws.‖134
a) Unconstitutional Vagueness
The vagueness doctrine ―emanates from the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . [and]
requires[:] (1) that a law give people of ordinary intelligence notice
of what is prohibited, and (2) that a law provide explicit standards
to law enforcement officers in order to avoid arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.‖135
A law that affects speech, therefore, is unconstitutionally vague
if a reasonable person cannot tell what speech the law prohibits
and what speech the law allows.136 Courts worry about possible
chilling effects of too-vague laws on constitutionally protected

131

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 948.
See id.
133
See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Com‘rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987)
(finding a law restricting all First Amendment activity at an airport overbroad, but not
vague).
134
Peter W. Poulos, Comment, Chicago‟s Ban on Gang Loitering: Making Sense of
Vagueness and Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 383 (1995).
135
Id. at 382.
136
See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (explaining that a
law is unconstitutionally vague if people ―of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application . . .‖); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357 (1983) (―As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.‖).
132
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speech.137 In order to avoid being penalized for breaking the law,
―some people may choose to limit the things they say and express
to a higher degree than the law intended.‖138 The Court
highlighted this concern in NAACP v. Button,139 where it held that
narrow tailoring is necessary ―[b]ecause First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive.‖140 For example, in
Smith v. Goguen,141 the Court held that a state law prohibiting
―contemptuous‖ treatment of a flag was unconstitutionally vague
because it ―fail[ed] to draw reasonably clear lines between the
kinds of nonceremonial treatment that are criminal and those that
are not.‖142 The Supreme Court has thus invalidated laws
regulating speech on vagueness grounds when they are ―so
ambiguous that the reasonable person cannot tell what expression
is forbidden and what is allowed.‖143
A law is also unconstitutionally vague if it does not prevent
officers from arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforcing it.144 For
example, in City of Houston v. Hill,145 the Court found
unconstitutional a city ordinance that criminalized the interruption
of police officers in the performance of their duties.146 The Court
held that the law was not narrowly tailored to proscribe only
disorderly conduct or fighting words, which likely would have
made the ordinance constitutional.147 The Court instead found that
the Houston law ―effectively grant[ed] police the discretion to
make arrests selectively on the basis of the content of the
speech.‖148
In the context of criminal law, including a criminal intent
requirement is one way to avoid invalidity due to vagueness. If a
137

Dr. Jonathan Mott, Ph.D., First Amendment: Speech, THISNATION.COM,
http://thisnation.com/textbook/ billofrights-speech.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
138
Id.
139
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
140
Id. at 432–33 (citations omitted).
141
415 U.S. 566 (1974).
142
Id. at 574.
143
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 942.
144
See Smith, 415 U.S. at 574.
145
482 U.S. 451 (1987).
146
See id.
147
See id. at 482 n.15.
148
See id.
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criminal statute or ordinance does not require criminal intent to
qualify for punishment, it is likely to be deemed unconstitutionally
vague.149 In City of Chicago v. Morales,150 the Court held that
where vagueness permeates the text of a criminal law that
―contains no mens rea requirement and infringes on
constitutionally protected rights,‖ the law is subject to facial
attack.151 The Supreme Court has thus recognized that ―the
constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to
whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.‖152
Though there is no bright-line test to determine whether a law
is unconstitutionally vague on its face, the Court has made it clear
that speech-restrictive laws need to be narrowly drawn, and that
they require particularly sharp precision in their language.153
Statutes and ordinances can and will be invalidated unless they
provide adequate notice to constituents of what is illegal and what
is not.154
b) Unconstitutional Overbreadth
A law may also be invalidated on grounds of overbreadth. A
law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially
more speech than the constitution permits to be regulated.155 The
person raising an overbreadth claim need not be affected directly
by the restriction; rather, a person to whom the law can be
constitutionally applied can argue that the same law would be
unconstitutional as applied to others.156 The doctrine provides that
149

See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
See id.
151
See id. at 55 (invalidating an ordinance that required a police officer, upon observing
a person whom he reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang member loitering in
any public place with one or more other persons, to order all such persons to disperse,
and made the failure to obey such an order promptly a violation of the ordinance, for
unconstitutional vagueness).
152
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); see also United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434–46 (1978); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 163 (1972); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342–43 (1952).
153
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 943.
154
See id. at 932.
155
See id.
156
See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (―Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to
150
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somebody ―whose speech is unprotected by the First Amendment
and who could constitutionally be punished under a more narrow
statute may argue that the law is [altogether overbroad] because of
how it might be applied to third parties not before the Court.‖157
For example, the Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting
all live entertainment as overbroad in Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim.158 In that case, an adult bookstore that featured live nude
dancers succeeded in challenging the ordinance, because it
outlawed all live entertainment—not just nude dancing.159 The
bookstore‘s claim was successful, in part, because of how the
ordinance would regulate the constitutional speech of third persons
not party to the case.160
3. Content-Based Restrictions
The Supreme Court has held that the core of First Amendment
speech protection is the protection from government regulations
based on the content of the speech.161 The Court has declared
content-based regulations to be ―presumptively invalid.‖162 In
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission,163 the Court made clear that content-based
regulations must meet strict scrutiny to be upheld, while contentneutral regulations need only meet intermediate scrutiny. 164 The
Turner Court explained that ―[g]overnment action that stifles
speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a
particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this
essential [First Amendment] right‖ and continued by noting that
whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute
on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other
situations not before the Court.‖).
157
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 943–44.
158
452 U.S. 61 (1981).
159
See id. at 73.
160
See id. at 66.
161
See Police Dep‘t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
162
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 882 (1992).
163
512 U.S. 662 (1994).
164
See id.; see also United States v. Playboy Entm‘t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815
(2000) (―We have made clear that the lesser scrutiny afforded regulations targeting the
secondary effects of crime or declining property values has no application to contentbased regulations targeting the primary effects of protected speech.‖).
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the First Amendment ―does not countenance governmental control
over the content of messages expressed by private individuals.‖165
In order to survive strict scrutiny, content-based speech
restrictions must be ―narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.‖166 Only a few specifically defined categories of contentbased speech are unprotected or less protected by the First
Amendment167: incitement (as defined by the Court in
Brandenburg), illegal activity, obscenity,168 child pornography,169
and defamation.170
a) Content and Viewpoint Neutrality
In order to constitutionally regulate speech, government laws
may not discriminate based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.171
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality in First
Amendment speech cases is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it
conveys.172 A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental
effect on some speakers or messages but not others.173 In United
States v. O‟Brien,174 the Court established a four-factor test to
165

Id. at 641.
See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990); Burson
v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334
(1988) (plurality); Bd. of Airport Comm‘rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569,
573 (1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry
Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
167
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 933.
168
The modern test regarding obscenity is ―whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.‖ Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
169
Unprotected child pornography involves ―works that visually depict sexual conduct
by children below a specified age.‖ New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
170
To be classified as unprotected defamation, the First Amendment requires that a
defamation plaintiff prove actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth when the
plaintiff is a public official or public figure. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
171
See First Nat‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978); see also 1
RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE NIMMER, ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:5 (3d ed. 1996).
172
See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984).
173
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–92 (1989).
174
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
166
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speech

[1] if it is within the constitutional power of
government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and [4] if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.175
Later, a fifth factor was added in City of Ladue v. Gilleo176:
whether the restriction ―leave[s] open ample alternative channels
for communication.‖177 The current test, akin to an ―intermediate
scrutiny‖ analysis, can be articulated as follows: government
regulation of expression is deemed content-neutral if it can be
―justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech‖
and is ―narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest,‖ while leaving open ―ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.‖178
Content-neutral
regulations, therefore, are evaluated under an ―intermediate
scrutiny‖ analysis. This means that the government cannot
regulate speech based on its viewpoint or subject unless the
regulation passes strict scrutiny.179
However, the Supreme Court has indicated that a regulation
that is facially content-based may be deemed content-neutral if it is
motivated by a permissible content-neutral purpose.180 In Renton
v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,181 the Court upheld an ordinance that
prohibited adult movie theaters from being located within 1,000
feet of certain designated areas.182 Though the ordinance was
content-based on its face as it applied only to those theaters that
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

See id. at 377.
512 U.S. 43 (1994).
See id. at 56 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
Id.
See id.
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showed adult films, the Court treated the regulation as contentneutral because the government was motivated by a desire to
control the secondary effects of the existence of these theaters,
such as crime, and not a desire to control the speech itself.183 Thus
Renton clarified that courts must look at the justification of the
law, and not its plain terms, when making content-neutrality
determinations.184
b) Public Forums and the Time, Place, or Manner Test
Time, place, or manner restrictions are a type of contentneutral speech regulation.185 The concept of time, place, or
manner restrictions refers to the government‘s ability to regulate
speech in a public forum in a manner that minimizes disruption of
a public space while still protecting First Amendment speech.186
The Court in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc.187 held that reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions are valid ―provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a
significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.‖188 For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence,189 the Court upheld a federal regulation that
prohibited sleeping in certain national parks over the objections of
protesters who had camped out in a national park to draw attention
183

See id. at 48.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 937. The author notes that the holding in
Renton has been strongly criticized by commentators because it ―permits an end run
around the First Amendment: The government can always point to some neutral, nonspeech justification for its actions.‖ Indeed, the Court has distinguished Renton in
subsequent cases.
185
See generally 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 828.
186
See id. at 1131.
187
452 U.S. 640 (1981).
188
Id. at 648 (upholding a regulation at the Minnesota State Fair that prohibited the
distribution of literature or the soliciting of funds except at booths. The regulation was
content-neutral because all literature and solicitations were regulated regardless of
speaker, viewpoint, or subject-matter. The governmental purpose was justified because
of its important interest in controlling pedestrian traffic at the fair. Finally, the Court
found that the Krishna had alternate ways to reach the fair‘s attendees, both off grounds
and at the fair booths.).
189
468 U.S. 288 (1984).
184
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to the plight of the homeless.190 The Court found that the
regulation was not aimed at suppressing symbolic speech, because
it applied to everyone in the park, and not just the protesters
involved in the case.191 The Court further noted that the regulation
was reasonably designed to further the substantial government
interest in conserving the national parks, a public space, by
minimizing the wear and tear that can be caused by campers.192
Finally, the Court found that it was a valid time, place, or manner
regulation because sleeping in the park was not banned generally,
but only prohibited in certain designated areas.193
Time, place or manner restrictions give the government the
power ―to regulate speech in a public forum in a manner that
minimizes disruption of public place while still protecting freedom
of speech.‖194 Time, place, and manner restrictions accommodate
public convenience and promote order by regulating for example,
noise,195 flow of pedestrian traffic,196 speech activities within 100
feet of the entrance to any healthcare facility, 197 and
demonstrations within 15 feet of doorways, parking lot entrances,
and driveways.198 The Court has held that nobody may ―insist
upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush
hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly.‖199
Time restrictions regulate ―whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular
place at a particular time.‖200 Manner restrictions impact how
speech can be delivered; for example, regulating the volume of the

190

See id. at 288.
See id. at 298.
192
See id. at 299.
193
See id. at 295.
194
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 1131.
195
See id. at 107–08.
196
See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654.
197
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
198
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particular presentation.201 Place restrictions regulate where
individuals may express themselves. The Court has recognized
three forums of public expression: traditional public forums,
―designated‖ public forums, and nonpublic forums.202
Traditional public forums are government properties that have
historically been available for the dissemination of information and
the communication of ideas, such as municipal streets and parks.203
Under First Amendment doctrine, the government may not close
traditional public forums to speech, but may place reasonable
restrictions on their use.204 The government may, however,
regulate speech in public forums under certain circumstances;205
but a content-based regulation still must pass strict scrutiny.206
Importantly, the Court has ruled that government regulation of
speech in traditional public forums need not use the least
restrictive alternative, but the restriction must always be narrowly
tailored to the ―government‘s legitimate, content-neutral
interests.‖207
Designated, or limited, public forums are ―place[s] that the
government could close to speech, but that the government
voluntarily, affirmatively opens to speech.‖208 The Court has held,
for example, that public schools and universities can become
limited public forums if they allow student and community groups

201

See, e.g., Jennifer L. Lambe, The Structure of Censorship Attitudes, 13 COMM. L. &
POL‘Y 485, 490 (2008); Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyrights Fair Use
Doctrince as a Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
31, 52 n.94 (2007).
202
See Int‘l Soc‘y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992)
(holding an airport operated by the Port Authority is a non-public forum, and therefore
the Port Authority‘s ban on solicitation there need only satisfy a reasonableness
standard).
203
See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 841 (2011).
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See Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
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See id.
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See id.
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See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (upholding a New
York City requirement that any concert using the Central Park Naumburg Bandshell had
to use city sound engineers and equipment, despite the fact that the city could have
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to use their property.209 As long as the government chooses to
allow speech in such a place, the rules regarding traditional public
forums apply.210
The third category—non-public forums—consists of those
―government properties that the government can close to all speech
activities.‖211 Airline terminals, 212 the area outside jailhouses,213
and military bases214 have all been deemed nonpublic forums
under the First Amendment. A lower level of scrutiny is applied
when the regulation involves a non-public forum because the
government may constitutionally prohibit or restrict speech in nonpublic forums ―so long as the regulation is reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral.‖215
II. HOW TO EFFECTIVELY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY REDUCE FLASH
MOB VIOLENCE: CONTENT-BASED VERSUS CONTENT-NEUTRAL
LAWS
It is clear that local governments must act in order to prevent
and penalize the organization of criminal flash mobs. Two
possible ways to regulate violent and criminal flash mobs are: (1)
content-based laws that prohibit the speech that incites mobs, and
(2) content-neutral laws, such as curfews, that target speech only
secondarily.
A. Regulations Related to Content of Flash Mob Advocacy
Messages
Content-based laws aimed at regulating digital speech that
incites flash mobs would be evaluated under the Brandenburg test.
To avoid being deemed unconstitutional, such laws would need to
be drafted with particularity to avoid vagueness and overbreadth.
1. Laws Regulating Incitement Speech Must Pass the
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

See id.
See id.
See id. at 1139.
See Int‘l Soc‘y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836–37 (1976).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 1139.
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Brandenburg Test
In order to pass constitutional muster, any law that regulates
the incitement of flash mobs would have to meet the requirements
set out in Brandenburg, that the speech ―is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.‖216 First, the Brandenburg test would require
the speaker to have intended to incite an ―imminent‖ criminal flash
mob. The imminence requirement is a temporal one, but need not
be interpreted as ―immediacy.‖217 Rather, ―imminence‖ can be
understood to mean ―predictability.‖218 If flexibly applied, the
Brandenburg test merely requires the regulated speech to be
directed at inciting lawlessness at a concrete, predictable time.219
Second, a law would have to be very clear about the type of speech
that is likely to incite or produce such action. Under such a law, a
speaker would not be punished for inciting a flash mob unless the
mob occurred, was violent or criminal in nature, and at least one
person was arrested for committing a crime associated with the
mob.
2. Avoiding Vagueness and Overbreadth
To avoid failure for vagueness or overbreadth, and to meet the
first prong of the Brandenburg test, a content-based regulation of
flash mob speech would require evidence of criminal intent. For
example, in order to punish the speech, a showing of actual intent
―to incit[e] or produc[e] imminent lawless action,‖220 such as
larceny or vandalism, would be required.

216

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
See David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative
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218
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time of the result, the Brandenburg test would not make sense. We should no more
regard the First Amendment as an excuse for a contract murder, for example, merely
because the conspirators scheduled it for a future date, than we should excuse a murder
accomplished by a time bomb. The time bomb causes ―imminent‖ harm in the sense that
once it is triggered, harm is highly likely and closely related. So does the contract
murder. To read Brandenburg otherwise would be to reach a result that the Supreme
Court could not possibly have intended.‖).
219
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A constitutional regulation would require the speech to contain
an explicit delineation of the time and place of the planned flash
mob in order to be punishable. The email, social media message,
or text message in question must contain particular, predetermined
―tip off‖ words to demonstrate criminal intent, such as ―rob,‖
―loot,‖ ―rage,‖ ―attack,‖ or ―mayhem,‖ and may not be as general
or innocuous as ―gathering,‖ ―meeting,‖ or ―party.‖
The statutory language of a flash mob law must also be very
specific about types of speech and social media that will be subject
to the regulation in order to provide adequate notice to potential
violators and to protect against unlimited and arbitrary police
discretion. A constitutional ordinance would require a clear listing
of devices and means by which potential violators broadcast their
message. For example, a law could proscribe calls for flash mobs
made via email, social media message, blog post, text message,
BlackBerry message, or Twitter.
In order to provide notice to potential violators and to provide
clear guidance for law enforcement, a constitutional regulation
must have specific application criteria. Flash mob participants
would only be subject to punishment for speech organizing the
mob if one or more persons were arrested for crimes committed as
part of the mob. A law might also include a minimum number of
people summoned to qualify as a flash mob. For example, a
speech-restrictive law could require that a message be distributed
to at least four people before triggering the flash mob law.
A law must clearly provide the penalties associated with its
violation. A successful content-based ordinance would categorize
violations as misdemeanors, and would impose only fines as
punishment, in order to be attractive to local legislatures.
Thus the law must be specific about he speaker‘s intent, what
language is included in the messages, the means by which those
messages can be sent, the particular characteristics of the mob and
mob activity, and what the penalties are for engaging in flash mob
incitement.
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3. Examples of Content-Based Regulations
The Cleveland, Ohio city council recently sponsored a proposal
for a content-based regulation that aims to punish the use of social
media to organize unlawful flash mob activity.221 Additionally,
Great Britain‘s Prime Minister David Cameron has voiced a
possible need for similar legislation in reaction to the recent flash
mob riots in London.222
a) Cleveland
The Cleveland city council approved a flash mob ordinance in
July 2011; however in August 2011, Mayor Frank Jackson vetoed
the law.223 He cited several constitutional issues, including the
danger of overbreadth, because ―it would impact law-abiding
citizens and wrongdoers alike.‖224 Mayor Jackson was also
concerned about the ―vague definition of ‗social media.‘‖225 The
July law would have prohibited the ―improper use of social media
to violate ordinances on disorderly conduct, public intoxication
and unlawful congregation by promoting illegal flash mob
activity.‖226 First offense violations ―would have resulted in a
misdemeanor charge and a fine of $100.‖227
In a second effort to enforce a flash mob law, the city council
proposed an amended set of ordinances, the goal of which was to
expand existing city laws so that people who use technology to

221

See Zack Reed & Jeff Johnson, Opposing View: Stop Criminal Flash Mobs, USA
TODAY, Sept. 15, 2011, at 8A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/
2011-09-14/flash-mobs-Cleveland-ordinance/50406092/1.
222
See J. David Goodman, In British Riots, Social Media and Face Masks are the
Focus, LEDE (Aug. 11, 2011), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/social-mediaand-facemasks-are-targets-after-british-riots.
223
See Cleveland: “Flash Mob” Law Vetoed by Mayor Jackson, WKYC.COM (Aug. 4,
2011), http://www.wkyc.com/news/article/200798/3/Cleveland-Flash-mob-law-vetoedby-Mayor-Jackson.
224
See id.
225
See Amanda Garrett, Mayor Frank Jackson Quashes New Social Media Ordinance
Aimed at Killing Flash Mobs, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 4, 2011), http://blog.cleveland.com
/metro/2011/08/mayor_
frank_jackson_quashes_ne.html.
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Cleveland: “Flash Mob” Law Vetoed by Mayor Jackson, supra note 221.
227
Id.
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create a public disturbance can be held accountable.228
Councilman Jeffrey Johnson stated, ―we want to send a message
from Cleveland City Council beginning tonight that those who
organize criminal flash mobs, that we‘re not only going to respond
to you, but we‘re going to prosecute you.‖ 229 Councilman
Michael D. Polensek said, ―[w]e‘ve been able to fashion three
pieces that tighten up various definitions within the codified
ordinances. We want to make the police have a little bit more
power in their effort to deal with the potential flash mob
situations.‖230 But Mayor Jackson refused to sign the law because
he believed that it mirrored existing state law and would not
change how flash mobs are regulated.231 However, because the
mayor took no affirmative action to approve or veto the law, a
provision of the city charter permitted the council‘s ordinance to
become law.232
Three components of the new law are:
[1] Inciting to riot. No person shall knowingly
engage in conduct designed to incite another to
commit a riot. This supplement ordinance targets
the individual(s) who organize a riot and would be a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
[2] Riot. No person shall participate with four or
more others in a course of disorderly conduct in
violation of Section 605.03,233 including but not
limited to a community event, place of business, or
any City of Cleveland property, facility, or
228

See Jessica Dabrowski, Cleveland Councilmen Take Another Shot at Flash Mobs,
FOX 8 CLEVELAND (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.fox8.com/news/wjw-flash-mobordinances-city-council-jd-txt,0,2014818.story.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
See Pat Galbincea, Flash Mob Ordinances Become Law in Cleveland Minus Mayor
Frank Jackson‟s Signature, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 13, 2011), http://blog.cleveland.com/
metro/2011/12/flash_mob_ordinances_become_la.html.
232
See id.
233
This ordinance outlines acts that constitute disorderly conduct, a minor
misdemeanor. CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 605, § 605.03 (2006),
available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Ohio/cleveland_oh/
codifiedordinancesofthecityofcleveland?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:cl
eveland_oh.
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recreation area. This amending ordinance focuses
on the individuals participating in a riot and would
be a misdemeanor of the first degree.
[3] Criminal tool.
This ordinance includes
―electronic media device‖ as part of the listing of
criminal tools under section 625.08234 of the
Codified Ordinances of Cleveland. This amending
ordinance would be a misdemeanor of the first
degree.235
Councilman Jeffrey Johnson argues that the new approach is
constitutional because it ―does not find fault in the use of social
media to express an opinion, but rather considers the organizer‘s
words as proof of criminal intent.‖236 James Hardiman, legal
director for the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, whose
group has opposed both flash mob ordinances, said ―he would have
preferred Jackson to veto the ordinances because ‗it will cause
more problems than it will ever solve.‘‖237 He added concerns
about the potential for illegal police searches and seizures and
discrimination as ―the law will target minorities.‖238
b) London
Young rioters in the United Kingdom have utilized
Blackberry‘s Messenger Service (―BBM‖) to organize flash
mobs.239 One BBM broadcast sent during riots in the city in
234

This ordinance lists and defines criminal tools. CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE OF
ORDINANCES ch. 625, § 625.08 (2011), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/
gateway.dll/Ohio/cleveland_oh/codifiedordinancesofthecityofcleveland?f=templates$fn=
default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:cleveland_oh.
235
Jen Steer, New Cleveland City Council Proposal Pushes for Ban on Flash Mobs . . .
Again, NEWSNET5.COM (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.newsnet5.com/dpp/news/local_
news/cleveland_metro/New-Cleveland-City-Council-proposal-pushes-for-ban-on-flashmobs-again.
236
Anita Ramasastry, To Honor First Amendment Rights, Cleveland and Other Cities
Should Focus on Flash Mob Violence, Not Instant Messaging, JUSTIA.COM (Oct. 11,
2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/10/11/to-honor-first-amendment-rights-clevelandand-other-cities-should-focus-on-flash-mob-violence-not-instant-messaging.
237
Galbincea, supra note 229.
238
Id.
239
See Olivia Solon, Why Has BlackBerry Been Blamed for the London Riots?,
WIRED.CO.UK (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-08/09/why-arewe-blaming-bbm-for-riots.
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August of 2010 read, ―Everyone from all sides of London meet up
at the heart of London (central) OXFORD CIRCUS!!, Bare
SHOPS are gonna get smashed up so come get some (free stuff!!!)
f**k the feds we will send them back with OUR riot! >:O Dead the
ends and colour war for now so if you see a brother... SALUT! if
you see a fed... SHOOT!.‖240 BBM activity occurs on a closed
network, making it nearly impossible for officials to monitor.241
British Prime Minister David Cameron is considering ways to give
British police ―the technology to trace people on Twitter or BBM
or close it down.‖242 In response to the proliferation of riots in
London, Cameron said he was working with police to consider
laws banning rioters from using social media, considering
―whether it would be right to stop people communicating via these
websites and services when we know they are plotting violence,
disorder, and criminality.‖243 Such regulations, if passed in the
United States, would likely fall into the category of prior restraints
and content-based restrictions.
B. Content-Neutral Regulations Aimed at Containing Violence
and Criminal Riots: Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
The Supreme Court has stated, ―regulations that are unrelated
to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny because in most cases they pose a less substantial risk of
excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.‖244
Time, place, and manner restrictions are constitutional if ―they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for

240
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communication of the information.‖245 Two types of time, place
and manner restrictions could target flash mobs—curfews and
permit requirements.
1. Curfews
Local governments have the option of imposing curfews for
minors as a means of deterring flash mob violence by teenagers. A
curfew law would be justified if it would decrease the likelihood of
violence in the city in a way that does not discriminate based on
expression of speech. A curfew would need to qualify as
significantly related to the government‘s interest in curbing
violence and criminal activity, which could be proved through use
of statistics relating to nighttime teen crime prevalence.246 Finally,
because a curfew law would only proscribe gatherings after a
particular hour, such a law would leave open ample alternative
times for communication of flash mob expression.
The mayor of Philadelphia recently enacted curfew
requirements for teenagers247 and Silver Spring, Maryland officials
are considering doing the same in an effort to curb teen loitering
and the proliferation of criminal flash mob activity. 248
Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter responded to flash mob
violence with measures including establishing a 9:00pm curfew for
teenagers on Friday and Saturdays in parts of the city. 249 Nutter
emphasized the need to punish young mob participants, as well as
their parents.250 Under the law, police will initially issue warnings
to parents whose teenagers break the curfew.251 After a warning
245

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
Flash mobs are heavily associated with black teenagers. See Patrik Jonsson, Flash
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has already been provided, the city will issue fines up to $500.252
Nutter said in response to the fine, ―I don‘t care what your
economic status is in life, you do not have a right to beat
somebody‘s ass on the street.‖253 In September 2011, Mayor
Nutter announced that he would continue to enforce the curfew
because it has been successful; there have been no flash mob
incidents since its inception in early August.254
Additionally, following the violent incidents that prompted the
curfew, Philadelphia police have increased patrols.255 The city is
also working with the FBI to track criminal use of social media256
and Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey has been
communicating with other law enforcement superintendents
around the county, brainstorming about other ideas to address this
type of criminal conduct.257
Silver Spring officials proposed enacting ―countywide bills that
would enforce a curfew and attempt to curb suspicious
loitering.‖258 Those who support the bills think that ―the use of a
curfew would be an effective way to keep teens from causing
mayhem or misbehaving in the evening,‖ suggesting that those
under the age of seventeen be off the streets by 11:00 p.m. on
weekdays and by midnight on weekends.259 The proposed
loitering bill would prohibit people from remaining ―in a public
place or establishment at a time or in a manner not usual for lawabiding persons under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and
reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons in
the vicinity.‖260
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2. Permit Requirements
Governments also have the option to require permits in order to
conduct activities on public grounds. A permit requirement law
would be justified if it would decrease the likelihood of criminal
flash mobs on public grounds without reference to flash-mobrelated speech. A permit requirement would need to qualify as
significantly related to the government‘s interest in curbing
violence and criminal activity, which could be proved through use
of statistics relating to the prevalence of criminal or violent activity
on public grounds. Finally, because a permit law would only
proscribe gatherings on public grounds without a permit, such a
law would leave open ample alternatives for communication of
flash mob expression on private grounds, as well as on public
grounds if the permit is granted.
The town of Braunschweig, Germany has a permit requirement
in place to allow for police review of plans for activity on public
grounds.261 The city recently increased its enforcement of an
existing law requiring permits for events on public grounds due to
flash mobs.262
When permits are not secured, local law
enforcement officials often station themselves in locations where
they expect flash mobs to take place in order to prevent
participation.263 As an alternative to physically stopping them, the
police attempt to establish contact with flash mob organizers ahead
of time to avoid surprise and to cancel the event peacefully.264
In 2009, German artist Dirk Schadt organized a flash mob
picnic at the city‘s central square, when a local office of the public
order contacted him to tell him it is illegal to conduct such an event
without a city permit.265 The government office learned of
Schadt‘s plan when an employee monitored a flash mob group on a
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See Richard Picciuto, Oct 01 . . . Flash Mobs, RAP361 (Oct. 1, 2011), http://rap
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262
See Picciuto, supra note 244.
263
See Heather Hamilton, Flash Mobs: More than a Fleeting Idea, NORTHERN LIGHT
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social networking site.266 The official requested Schadt‘s email
address from the website and contacted Schadt to tell him that his
event would not be allowed.267 A government official later noted
that had Schadt gotten a permit, police intervention could have
been avoided entirely.268
III. CONTENT-BASED LAWS WILL BEST SERVE GOVERNMENT
GOALS OF DETERRING CRIMINAL AND VIOLENT FLASH MOBS
Content-based regulations punishing the speaker who incites a
criminal flash mob will be more effective in deterring and
controlling violence and crime than content-neutral laws such as
curfews and permit requirements. Content-neutral laws do not
target the root of the problem, and curfew and permit laws are easy
to circumvent. Carefully written content-based regulations will
specifically punish and deter the creation of violent, criminal flash
mobs without proscribing other, unrelated activities in the way that
time, place and manner regulations would. Utilizing a carefully
drafted content-based flash mob regulation, it is possible to pass
the Brandenburg test and avoid penalizing those who incite and
participate in ―good‖ flash mobs, like those associated with the
Arab Spring. An example of such an ordinance is included below.
A. Content-Neutral Laws will Not Target the Real Problem
Neither curfew laws nor permit requirements address the heart
of the problem of criminal flash mobs. While curfew laws may
limit criminal flash mobs composed of children under the statutory
age and after the curfew time, they will not curb crime among
those above age or those participating in mobs before the curfew
time. ―Flash robs‖ are not always conducted by minors and are not
always conducted at night.269 Moreover, curfew laws are subject
266

See id.
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268
See id.
269
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to intermediate scrutiny, and may be found impermissibly vague.
Curfew laws are also often the target of equal protection and
substantive due process claims.
Similarly, permit requirements are problematic because they
only affect flash mobs set to occur on public grounds. Because
many of the criminal flash mobs are robberies, they occur in
shopping malls and private stores, areas that would not be subject
to the permit restrictions.
B. “Good Flash Mobs” Need Not Be Criminalized
In light of recent political and social revolution in the
Middle East, flash mob speech laws may be criticized for
punishing the organization of all such events, without
differentiating between those mobs formed to commit robberies,
commit vandalism, or disturb the peace and those mobs formed to
protest dictatorships, corrupt governments, and human rights
violations. A way around this problem is to distinguish between
politically motivated, subversive advocacy speech that, while often
tending to promote violence, is spoken in order to promote
political ideals and to organize protests, and incitement speech that
is spoken for the purpose of inciting random, malicious criminal
behavior.
C. A Proposed Constitutional Ordinance
The following language may be used by state and local
governments to address the current trend in violent and criminal
flash mob activity, while remaining in line with the Supreme
Court‘s First Amendment jurisprudence.
Inciting a criminal flash mob. No person shall
knowingly engage in conduct designed to incite
another to participate in a criminal flash mob. This
ordinance targets only those individual(s) arrested
for another crime or crimes committed as part of a
criminal flash mob and who organized such mob by
sending a message via an electronic media device or
outlet including, but not limited to, SMS, Facebook,
BlackBerry Messenger, and Twitter, specifically
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calling for the recipients to ―rob,‖ ―loot,‖ ―rage,‖
―attack,‖ ―riot,‖ or engage in ―mayhem‖ at a
specified date, time, and place. The act of inciting a
criminal flash mob is a misdemeanor of the first
degree.
Criminal flash mob: Defined. A planned gathering
of five or more people engaging in disorderly and/or
criminal conduct, including but not limited to
burglary, larceny, vandalism, arson, and battery,
organized via electronic device or social media
platform and with the primary purpose of
committing
crimes,
misdemeanors,
and/or
disturbing community peace.
CONCLUSION
Due to the gravity of, and spike in, the number of criminal
flash mobs in United States cities, local governments must be
allowed to regulate the speech that ignites them. Content-neutral
laws, such as youth curfews and permit requirements, may result in
a temporary decrease in crime, but such laws are easy to maneuver
around and will not get to the root of a growing problem. Instead,
lawmakers should punish the incitement of criminal flash mobs
through carefully drafted ordinances that assign liability only if
one or more persons have been arrested for other flash mob-related
crimes. Laws that require intent to incite a criminal flash mob,
predictability of the flash mob‘s occurrence, and the criminal flash
mob‘s actual occurrence will survive Brandenburg scrutiny and
minimize chilling effects on free speech. Such content-based laws
will best serve the government‘s goal of deterring flash mob crime
in that they will directly target and penalize those who start those
mobs that actually result in criminal activity. It is important that
governments stay within the limits of the longstanding and
carefully developed First Amendment jurisprudence, and it is
imperative that they take action to control and deter the violent,
criminal behavior that is plaguing our cities.

